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Saving Money on Health Insurance Just Got a lot Easier . . . 
Or Did It?: The Preserving Employee Wellness Programs 
Act and its Impact on the Future of Employee Health 
ZACHARY MACIEJEWSKI* 
ABSTRACT 
This Note addresses the growing use of employer-sponsored wellness programs in 
the American workplace and the concomitant harms and risks these programs 
impose on employee privacy and insurance costs. Specifically, this Note analyzes the 
Preserving Employee Wellness Programs Act (PEWPA)—a proposed law that would 
allow employers to require employees to disclose genetic information to qualify for 
an employer-sponsored wellness program (and the program’s associated insurance 
premium benefits). This Note ultimately argues that employees and employee 
advocacy groups must work to thwart PEWPA to preserve employee privacy in the 
face of mounting corporate pressure to alter the structure of employer-sponsored 
health insurance. 
INTRODUCTION 
Employer-sponsored wellness programs have secured a comfortable position in 
corporate America since Congress and President Barack Obama enacted the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010. The ACA amended the Public 
Health Services Act (PHSA) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) to permit employers to offer wellness incentives as part of group health 
plans.1 The success of wellness programs, in large part, rests on employers’ 
presumptions that wellness programs decrease employer-borne health insurance 
costs, bolster employee health through weight management regimens and smoking 
cessation programs, and lead to a more productive workforce.2 Employers deem the 
programs an opportunity for employees to receive an insurance premium deduction 
of up to thirty percent—an opportunity few employees have good reason to reject.3 
Legal and social sciences scholars have written much on the efficacy of wellness 
programs and whether the enormous incentive to participate in (or penalty to abstain 
from) them truly provides employees with a voluntary choice. Most scholars argue 
that the programs do not.4 
 
 
 *  J.D. Candidate 2020, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A., Political 
Science, 2017, Wabash College. I would like to thank Professor Jody Madeira for her 
invaluable feedback, advice, and revisions during the seminar for which this Note was 
originally drafted.  
 1. Alfred Lewis, Vikram Khanna & Shana Montrose, Employers Should Disband 
Employee Weight Control Programs, 21 AM. J. MANAGED CARE e91 (2015). 
 2.  Id. at e91. 
 3. Id. 
 4.  See, e.g., Matt Lamkin, Health Care Reform, Wellness Programs and the Erosion of 
Informed Consent, 101 KY L.J. 435, 437 (2013) (arguing that conditioning insurance premium 
reductions on employee participation in wellness programs ironically reduces employee 
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Around the same time wellness programs garnered popularity, direct-to-consumer 
(“DTC”) genetic testing companies, such as 23andMe and Color Genomics, 
determinedly launched themselves into the consumer health arena.5 DTC companies 
provide services allowing consumers to trace their genealogy and genetic history and 
to examine whether they are genetically predisposed to adverse health conditions, 
such as cancer or heart disease.6 While DTC testing services enjoy largescale 
consumer participation, legal scholars criticize DTC companies for inadequately 
disclosing to consumers how their genetic information may be used, especially when 
consumers choose to analyze their genetic predisposition to disease.7 Put differently, 
critics argue that DTC companies do not secure the type of informed consent from 
consumers that the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
requires when doctors and patients engage in genetic testing. DTC genetic testing 
companies do not provide results from the tests to a consumer’s doctor, but they do 
warn consumers that insurers may use information consumers receive from the tests 
against them via enlarged premiums.8 Indeed, healthcare lawyers and medical 
professionals are particularly concerned that consumers who learn they are 
predisposed to disease will provide their test results to doctors,9 and insurance 
providers might increase premiums.10 
Wellness programs and DTC genetic testing are two separate phenomena. 
Wellness programs allow employees to reduce health insurance costs through 
pledges to exercise, quit smoking, and live more active and healthy lifestyles.11 DTC 
genetic testing, on the other hand, allow consumers to dig into their ancestral history 
 
 
health). But see Ron Z. Goetzel, et al., Do Workplace Health Promotion (Wellness) Programs 
Work?, 56 J. ENVTL. & OCCUPATIONAL MED. 927 (2014) (maintaining that workplace wellness 
programs increase employee health). 
 5.  See, e.g., Erika Check Hayden, The Rise, Fall and Rise Again of 23andMe, 550 
NATURE 174, 176 (2017) (describing 23andMe’s 2009 resurgence into DTC genetic testing 
for disease predisposition). 
 6.  Id. at 177. 
 7.  See, e.g., Erica Che, Note, Workplace Wellness Programs and the Interplay Between 
the ADA’s Prohibition on Disability-Related Inquiries and Insurance Safe Harbor, 2017 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV 280, 302–03 (2017) (arguing that employees do not receive proper 
disclosure from employers about how their medical information can be used in workplace 
wellness programs). 
 8.  See Linsey Jones, FDA Regulation Defines Business Strategy in Direct-to-Consumer 
Genetic Testing, BIOTECH CONNECTION (Oct. 30, 2017), 
https://biotechconnectionbay.org/view-points/fda-regulation-defines-business-strategy-in-
direct-to-consumer-genetic-testing/ [https://perma.cc/K8EU-TMZU]. 
 9.  Id. In theory, providing information from a genetic test to a doctor would be a good 
thing because doctors are able to screen for specific diseases. However, the fear is that 
insurance companies will receive the genetic information before the disease is covered, thus 
inflating premiums. See id. 
 10. See Julia Ries, There’s a Catch that Comes with Taking a 23AndMe Test, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/23andme-warnings-at-
home-genetic-test_n_5c01b108e4b0606a15b54dae [https://perma.cc/8CF6-A2JR] 
(discussing how GINA often does not apply to life insurance, “meaning that these premiums 
could very well fluctuate based on your test results.”). 
 11.  Lewis, Khanna & Montrose, supra note 1, at e91. 
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and discover whether they are predisposed to genetic health issues.12 Nevertheless, 
congressional concern that employers could use employee genetic information as a 
weapon against employees prompted Congress to enact the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA).13 GINA prohibits employers from requesting 
employee genetic information and from using employee genetic information against 
them. As of now, GINA bars employers from factoring employee genetic 
information into whether employees qualify for wellness programs.14  
Congress is currently considering the Preserving Employee Wellness Programs 
Act (PEWPA).15 The Act, which passed through committee on partisan lines, would 
permit employers to require employees to submit to genetic testing to qualify for an 
employer-sponsored wellness program—and thus to qualify for the insurance 
premium deductions attached to the wellness program.16 In light of the safeguards 
Congress enacted to protect employee genetic information and employee autonomy, 
Congress should strike down PEWPA and enact measures to bolster employee choice 
and autonomy regarding the use of their genetic information. What is more, Congress 
must ensure that if an employee provides genetic information they do so voluntarily.  
Part I of this Note will analyze the Act in light of literature and litigation regarding 
wellness programs and DTC genetic testing. Part II contemplates PEWPA’s legality 
in light litigation stemming from the EEOC’s recently promulgated rules permitting 
employers to require an employee’s spouse to provide genetic information to qualify 
for a wellness program. Part III proscribes a plan to respond to the Act and its 
implications, whether Congress enacts it or not. 
 
 
 12.  Hayden, supra note 5, at 175–76. 
 13.  Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. §2000ff-1(b)(2) 
(2018). 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Preserving Employee Wellness Programs Act, H.R. 1313, 115th Cong. (2017); see 
also Michael R. Dohn, Personal Genomics and Genetic Discrimination: Is Increased Access 
a Good Thing, 45 W. ST. L. REV. 107, 124–25 (2018) (discussing how PEWPA would erode 
GINA protections). 
 16.  While the Act passed committee on partisan lines, with all Republicans voting for the 
Act and all Democrats against it, President Obama, a democrat, sparked genetic data pooling 
with the Precision Medicine Initiative—which has since evolved into the National Institute of 
Health’s All of Us research program. All of Us works to solve America’s current healthcare 
crisis through precision medicine—a medical technique that works to cure a specific patients 
or groups of patients by using their genetic code to search for medical predispositions. See 
SEAN RILEY, PRESERVING EMPLOYEE WELLNESS PROGRAMS ACT (HR 1313, 115TH CONGRESS), 
DUKE SCI. POL. 2 (2017); Sy Mukherjee, It Might Soon Be Legal for Employers to Force You 
Into a Genetic Test, FORTUNE (Mar. 10, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/10/genetic-testing-
workplace-wellness-bill/ [https://perma.cc/8WEA-92CQ].  
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I. EMPLOYER-SPONSORED WELLNESS PROGRAMS AND GENETICS: PARTICIPATION 
FACTORS, COERCION, & THE EEOC  
 
 This Part discusses the coercive role employer-sponsored wellness programs 
play in the American workplace. Section A analyzes relevant statutes and litigation 
in the employer-sponsored wellness program sphere and their potential impact on 
employees. Section B places DTC genetic testing within the context of GINA and 
relevant informed consent standards and fleshes out why DTC genetic testing 
should be subject to informed consent standards to preserve GINA’s purpose. 
A. Wellness Programs: The Path Towards Employer-Mandated Compulsion of 
Genetic Information  
The term “wellness program” typically refers to employer-sponsored health 
promotion and disease prevention programs offered to employees. Some wellness 
programs are part of an employer-sponsored group health plan, while others are not; 
this Note will focus on the former. Wellness programs generally ask employees to 
answer questions on a health risk assessment (HRA), undergo biometric screenings 
for risk factors (such as high blood pressure or cholesterol), or partake in nutrition 
classes and weight loss and smoking cessation programs.17 Some employers 
encourage employee spouses to participate in wellness programs, especially when 
the employee is part of a group health plan.18 
Before Congress enacted the ACA, employers offered small-scale incentives, like 
gift cards or additional vacation days, to employees who participated in wellness 
programs.19 But these incentives proved ineffective at reducing health costs. They 
did not motivate employees to make substantial changes to their lifestyles.20 To make 
wellness programs worth employer time and effort, Congress raised the ceiling on 
employer-sponsored, health-conditioned insurance premium deductions to thirty 
percent—meaning that employees participating in employee-only health insurance 
plans could see nearly $1,800 per year deducted from their insurance premiums.21  
Studies show that most employees participate in employer-sponsored wellness 
programs because they believe the programs offer a convenient method to bolster 
their health.22 The potential to save money on health insurance premiums and copays 
increase employee desire to take advantage of wellness programs, leading many 
 
 
 17.  Id. at 3. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  See Lamkin, supra note 4, at 450. 
 20.  See Lewis, Khanna & Montrose, supra note 1, at e91. 
 21.  Id. See also U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC’S FINAL RULE ON 
EMPLOYER WELLNESS PROGRAMS AND THE GENETIC INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION ACT 2 
(2016) (finding that under employee-only plans with a self-option premium of $6,000, 
employees participating in wellness programs could save up to $1,800 via the ACA’s thirty 
percent insurance premium deduction scheme).  
 22.  See Alan Kohll, Why More Employees Don’t Embrace Wellness Programs, and How 
to Fix It, FORBES (June 22, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alankohll/2017/06/22/why-
more-employees-dont-embrace-wellness-programs-and-how-to-fix-it/#2d07acf01d95 
[https://perma.cc/5SZ9-T73T]. 
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employees not to question the terms of the contract they enter into with their 
employer.23 To qualify, many employees simply check a box pledging they will work 
out, eat healthier, and refrain from smoking.24 From an employee perspective, how 
could a regime designed to save you money and make you healthier harm you? None 
of these requirements are subjectively or objectively bad, and they will only foster a 
healthier population.25  
Comparing employer-sponsored wellness programs to adhesion contracts, which 
they might well be, may help shed additional light on why employees participate in 
wellness programs. Most consumers never read the terms and conditions of contracts 
that will cost them substantial sums of money because they know that, if they 
disagree with the terms, they cannot use the product or service.26 This is true for 
powerful companies like Amazon and Apple that present customers with lengthy 
electronic disclosures that they can easily pass over by clicking a button. It would 
not be surprising, then, if employees never read the terms of their employer-
sponsored wellness contract. After all, why read something that is supposed to make 
you healthier and save you money if you never read the terms for something for 
which you are spending money? It might be that “innocuous” programs encouraging 
you to exercise and not smoke would not trigger protective instincts. 
On their face, wellness programs attached to large insurance premium deductions 
should encourage healthy behaviors, decrease employee risk to injury and disease, 
and suppress employer susceptibility to increased healthcare costs.27 However, 
studies on whether employer-sponsored wellness programs have actually cultivated 
healthier workforces and decreased employer-borne healthcare expenses have 
yielded largely negative results.28 In fact, wellness programs with such large 
 
 
 23.  Angela Lashbrook, Your Boss Wants You Healthy for All the Wrong Reasons, THE 
OUTLINE (Nov. 29, 2018), https://theoutline.com/post/6714/your-boss-wants-you-healthy-for-
all-the-wrong-reasons?zd=1&zi=has5yfeh [https://perma.cc/S2DS-4P75]. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  David Greene, Do You Read the Terms of Service Contracts? Not Many Do, Research 
Shows, NPR (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/08/23/491024846/do-you-read-
terms-of-service-contracts-not-many-do-research-shows [https://perma.cc/5AMN-47ZF]. 
 27.  See Sharon Begley, Do Workplace Wellness Programs Improve Employees’ Health?, 
STAT NEWS (Feb. 19, 2016) https://www.statnews.com/2016/02/19/workplace-wellness-
programs-employee-health/ [https://perma.cc/L9SQ-TWFM]; Austin Frakt & Aaron E. 
Carroll, Do Workplace Wellness Programs Work? Usually Not, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/12/upshot/do-workplace-wellness-programs-work-
usually-not.html [https://perma.cc/KP3G-Z5VC]. 
 28.  See SOEREN MATTKE, HANGSHENG LIU, JOHN P. CALOYERAS, CHRISTINA Y. HUANG, 
KRISTIN R. VAN BUSUM, DMITRY KHODYAKOV & VICTORIA SHIER, RAND HEALTH, 
WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS STUDY: FINAL REPORT 45-46 (2013) (finding smoking 
cessation to be the only health behavior where achieving the health goal earned a greater 
reward than participating in the program); Sharon Begley, Exclusive: ‘Workplace Wellness’ 
Fails Bottom Line, Waistlines – RAND, REUTERS (May 24, 2013), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wellness/exclusive-workplace-wellness-fails-bottom-line-
waistlines-rand-idUSBRE94N0XX20130524 [https://perma.cc/T2HN-ZDC9] (reporting that 
participants in wellness programs lose an average of one pound every three years and that 
participating does not yield significant reduction in cholesterol levels). See also Ann Hendrix 
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insurance premium deductions may actually harm employee health, coerce patients, 
and impair their autonomy.29 
The question of whether wellness programs unduly coerce employees has 
garnered much attention in corporate, employment, and healthcare law circles.30 In 
2017, the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) won a court battle 
against the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regarding EEOC 
rules permitting employers to charge or penalize employees choosing not to 
participate in health screenings or provide health information related to employer-
sponsored wellness programs.31 The EEOC’s rule would have authorized employers 
to impose insurance premium rates up to two or three times the rate imposed on 
employees who did provide requested information and engage in health checks.32 
The District Court for the District of Columbia vacated the EEOC rule, holding that 
a thirty percent insurance premium hike on employees who chose not to participate 
in a wellness program was considered involuntary.33  
AARP’s strategy of framing the issue as a penalty imposed on employees for 
failing to participate in wellness programs, rather than as an incentive to partake in 
them, proved key to why AARP won the lawsuit and shed light on employer motives 
in the wellness and insurance industries.34 The court’s decision was somewhat novel. 
Many courts and scholars who sympathize with corporate and employer interests 
have refused to call the insurance premium deductions “penalties” but instead label 
them “incentives” for employees to provide employers with sought-after 
information.35 But while the court handed employees and patients a win, it also 
 
 
& Josh Buck, Employer-Sponsored Wellness Programs: Should Your Employer Be the Boss 
of More than Your Work?, 38 SW L. REV. 465, 466–67 (2009) (urging employers to recognize 
employee concerns regarding discrimination based on genetic information). 
 29.  See Lamkin, supra note 4, at 466 (finding that financial incentives attached to 
wellness programs may harm patient health by forcing patients to partake in aggressive 
medical procedures they would otherwise not participate in). 
 30.  Compare Press Release, American Benefits Counsel, Consistent Federal Policy and 
Regulatory Framework Vital for Workplace Wellness Programs 1 (Mar. 1, 2017) (asserting 
that wellness programs are beneficial to employers and employees, have been successful, 
Congress must streamline legislation to ensure wellness programs remain a valuable tool for 
employers), with David Frank, Workers Score Court Victory on Workplace Wellness Rules, 
AARP (Aug. 14, 2017) (encouraging lawmakers to restrict incentives attached to wellness 
programs and ensure employees are not penalized for not participating in programs that do not 
have a strong record of success). 
 31.  AARP v. United States Equal EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 292 F. Supp. 3d 238 
(D.D.C. 2017). Dara Smith, lead attorney for the AARP Foundation Litigation, praised the 
court’s ruling, claiming “[i]t means two fewer years of coercive penalties imposed on 
employees who exercise their civil right to keep private health-related information private in 
the workplace.” David Frank, AARP Wins Victory for Worker’s Civil Rights, AARP (Dec. 22, 
2017), https://www.aarp.org/politics-society/advocacy/info-2017/eeoc-workers-rights-
fd.html [https://perma.cc/H9XU-354Y]. 
 32.  Frank, supra note 31. 
 33.  AARP, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 244–45. 
 34.  Frank, supra note 31. 
 35.  While the 2017 AARP case dealt primarily with procedural issues, the court did not 
cite to a single case discussing why the EEOC’s thirty percent premium hike was not 
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punted on key provisions of the EEOC rule that permit employers to require an 
employee’s spouse to produce genetic information to participate in a wellness 
program. If an employee’s spouse refuses to provide the information, the employee 
does not receive the insurance premium deduction because their spouse cannot 
participate in the wellness program.36 The court’s decision not to address the genetic 
component has proved crucial to the PEWPA’s fate.  
Some scholars suggest wellness programs can coerce employees if the programs 
diminish an employee’s right to informed consent.37 Informed consent ensures that 
patients understand the benefits and risks of medical procedures and voluntarily 
consent to or refuse them.38 Not all wellness programs should be considered “medical 
procedures.”39 For example, a wellness program that requires an employee to 
exercise or participate in a smoking cessation program would not be considered a 
medical procedure because it does not require the employee to establish a doctor-
patient relationship. However, wellness programs that require patients to receive 
medical treatment, such as taking medication or undergoing medical tests, should be 
considered “medical procedures” governed by informed consent because they do 
require patients to establish a doctor-patient relationship.40 And full disclosure 
applies in contexts outside of medical procedures as well. Thus, whether a wellness 
program violates a patient’s right to informed consent should center on the nature of 
the plan, including the treatment regimen and whether the patient’s choice to 
participate in that regimen is voluntary.  
Whether a decision is truly voluntary centers on whether the patient is 
substantially free from external influence.41 Faden and Beauchamp, two influential 
ethics scholars, maintain that outside influence weakens voluntariness if the patient 
cannot resist the stimulus.42 Threats to penalize patients for not partaking in certain 
actions, as well as incentives inviting them to participate, can violate a patient’s right 
to informed consent if the patient finds the penalty or incentive difficult to resist.43 
And while employers can no longer “penalize” employees for not participating in 
wellness programs, they can still offer “incentives” for participating. In the realm of 
insurance premium deductions, drawing the line between a “penalty” and an 
“incentive” is virtually impossible; deducting money from an employee’s premium 
and requiring an employee to pay additional money are two sides of the same coin. 
Thus, it follows that wellness programs that induce patients to make choices 
regarding medical procedures they would not have made but for the “incentive” 
violate patients’ rights to informed consent. 
 
 
voluntary. AARP, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 243. See Lamkin, supra note 4 at 441-42 (noting that 
wellness programs can be framed as either penalties or incentives and, thus, determining when 
something is one of the other is quite hard to do). 
 36.  AARP, 292 F. Supp. 3d at 244–45. 
 37.  Lamkin, supra note 4, at 446-47. 
 38.  Ruth R. Faden & Tom L. Beauchamp, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED 
CONSENT 8 (1986). 
 39.  Id. at 358. 
 40.  See Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. at 256. 
 43.  Id. at 261–62. 
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While the ACA amended the PSHA and ERISA to permit employers to offer 
wellness programs, it did not amend key provisions of the PSHA, ERISA or the ADA 
barring insurance companies from discriminating against employees based on their 
participation in a wellness program.44 Nevertheless, insurance companies quickly 
took advantage of the amendments and pitched employers with plans centered on 
reducing healthcare costs via wellness programs. For example, Blue Care Network 
of Michigan began offering employers a group health plan called “Healthy Blue 
Living.”45 Employees participating in Healthy Blue Living received enhanced 
benefits, like decreased deductibles for ninety days. After ninety days, employees 
have to visit their primary physician to begin a wellness program. Blue Care requires 
physicians to fill out a form confirming employee participation in the plan. If 
employees refuse to participate, they lose their enhanced benefits and have to pay 
higher copays and deductibles.46  
BeniComp Advantage offers a similar program but reverses the order in which 
employees see decreased healthcare costs. BeniComp starts by increasing employee 
deductibles. Only once employees agree to comply with wellness program 
conditions, including provisions requiring them to take prescribed medications, do 
deductibles and premiums decrease.47 Most employees know that wellness programs 
will require them to exercise or quit smoking, but they often do not know that they 
will have to take prescribed medication or undergo medical tests. These deductions 
are not de minimus, and large discounts are much more likely to coerce employees 
to participate in employer-sponsored wellness programs, even if it means consuming 
unwanted medication or enduring invasive tests.48  
For Lamkin, this Hobson’s choice vitiates informed consent.49 Lamkin argues that 
incentivizing employees to participate in wellness programs can vitiate informed 
consent because the programs may require employees to participate in healthcare 
regimens they would not adopt but for the financial penalty for not doing so.50 If 
wellness incentives become too large, it is reasonable to assume that they influence 
employees to make decisions against their values, thereby rendering the incentive a 
“penalty.”51 When wellness program mandates shift from nothing at all to smoking 
cessation and weight-loss regimens to requiring participants to take certain 
medications, the informed consent waters become increasingly murky.52 
Encouraging people to quit smoking or hit the gym through incentive programs does 
not violate informed consent. But cloaking a “penalty” as an “incentive” and coercing 
patients into deciding based on a financial inducement does.53 
 
 
 44.  Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 33158 (June 3, 2013) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 146 & 147). 
 45. Lamkin, supra note 4, at 449. 
 46.  Id. at 449–50. 
 47.  Id. at 449–51. 
 48.  Id.  
 49.  See id. at 457. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 450. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  See id. at 450–57. 
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Persad discounts Lamkin’s argument, claiming that wellness programs cannot 
harm employees because encouraging better health and wellness cannot place 
employees in a position worse than what they were in prior to participating in the 
program.54 Persad compares a potential wellness requirement pressuring a patient to 
consume certain medications with a taxi driver’s requirement to go to the eye doctor 
to retain her license. He suggests that, because requiring a taxi driver to go to the 
doctor and receive new glasses does not vitiate informed consent simply because it 
requires the taxi driver to make a decision based on financial incentives, it is not 
coercive to require an individual to take medicine to qualify for an insurance 
premium deduction.55  
B. Employer-Compelled Genetic Testing: GINA, 23andMe & their Turbulent 
Relationship with Informed Consent in Consumer Settings 
  Section B.1 discusses the history and purpose of GINA, as well as the role 
that employers and insurance companies play in undermining GINA’s goals. 
Section B.2 examines the lack of an informed consent standard in the DTC genetic 
testing realm. Specifically, Section B.2 warns consumers about the potential harms 
of providing DTC genetic testing companies sensitive medical information that is 
not subject to a confidential patient-physician relationship. 
1. GINA and Safeguarding Patient Genetic Information 
GINA stemmed, in part, from congressional concern that employers would try to 
take advantage of massive technological advances in genetic information processing 
to obtain employee genetic information and use it to make cost-related decisions.56 
Passed with almost unanimous support, GINA bars insurance companies from 
denying coverage or charging larger premiums to healthy individuals purely because 
of their genetic predisposition to developing a disease.57 GINA also prohibits 
employers from making hiring, firing, or promotion decisions based on an 
individual’s genetic makeup.58  
When Democrats enacted the ACA in 2010, they also invested billions of dollars 
into precision medicine.59 Precision medicine is an approach to patient care where 
doctors ask patients to participate in genetic tests, the results of which help formulate 
a personalized patient-treatment plan centered on the individual’s genetic makeup. 
Doctors use precision medicine most often when treating cancerous tumors, because 
patient genetics allow doctors to understand the disease better and to develop 
 
 
 54.  Govind Persad, Paying Patients: Legal and Ethical Dimensions, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH 
177, 228–29 (2018). 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  See Riley, supra note 16, at 2. 
 57.  Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. §2000ff-1(b)(2) 
(2018). 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  See Riley, supra note 16, at 2. 
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personalized treatment regimens unique to a specific disease and patient.60 Patients 
must voluntarily provide their genetic information and must consent to doctors using 
it before undergoing any medical procedures.61  
The law provides special protection to genetic information, especially in the 
medical realm.62 Currently, Title II of GINA undoubtedly provides the strongest 
protections. Title II bars employers and insurance companies from requesting 
employee genetic information, and thus encourages patients to provide genetic 
information for medical procedures, especially precision medicine.63 GINA works to 
quell patient concern that insurers and employers will penalize them for their genetic 
makeup and predisposition to disease.64 But insurance companies skirted ACA 
provisions barring them from discriminating against employees based on their 
participation in wellness programs by inducing employers to do the work for them 
via insurance premium deductions.65 Now, insurers are attempting to do the same 
with genetic information.66 
2. 23andMe and Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: Consumer Foray into 
Dangerous Waters 
Consumers remain fascinated with genealogy and genetic makeup.67 Genetics and 
genealogy are mysterious to most people, yet they control who we are as humans—
more than almost anything else.68 Aside from information passed on from relatives, 
it is hard to tell where we really come from in the world. And even if our relatives 
possess insight on our genealogy, they cannot provide information about our genetic 
predisposition to disease. Many families have an idea if they are predisposed to heart 
disease or diabetes based on struggles their relatives have had with those ailments. 
But simply knowing your familial track record for disease does not provide insight 
into why genetics predispose us to certain diseases and whether we carry those traits. 
Past experiences leave us anxious and wanting more. DTC genetic testing companies 
allow consumers to delve into their genetic code and have helped consumers solve 
some of the enigmatic issues about their lineage, their familial risk for cancer, and 
how they can plan a safer pregnancy and optimize their diet and fitness regimens.69 
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While DTC genetic testing companies assert that they do not diagnose consumers, 
this contention is highly debatable, especially when considering their recent foray 
into genetic health risk (GHR) reports, which approximate a user’s risk for 
developing a disease.70 
As an in vitro test, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) classifies DTC 
genetic tests as medical devises.71 Unlike laboratory-developed tests (LDTs), 
physicians do not order DTC genetic tests. Consequently, DTC genetic tests do not 
require a physician or trained expert to explain the results of the test, though the FDA 
regulates DTC genetic testing companies and requires them prove that they are 
accurately and safely relaying information to consumers.72 
Experts estimate that twelve million Americans participated in DTC genetic tests 
in 2017, meaning that one in twenty-five American adults possess access to personal 
genetic data.73 The DTC genetic testing industry reached almost $100 million in sales 
in 2017, with experts predicting the industry’s value to skyrocket to upwards of $350 
million by 2022.74 Consumer interest in genetic literacy will persist—at least for the 
near future—and on many levels, that is remarkable. But as the adage goes: “With 
great power, comes great responsibility.”75 Genetic information is immensely 
powerful. Consumers now have the ability to trace their ancestry—something most 
people never fathomed could happen.76 What most consumers do not know, 
however, is how this powerful, enlightening tool can be wielded against them—
especially by insurance companies.77  
GINA bars insurance companies from requiring individuals to provide them 
information they receive from genetic testing companies.78 However, if a person 
receives disheartening information from a DTC test and provides that information to 
their doctor, who then diagnoses the patient with a disorder or prescribes treatments 
tailored to specific ailments, insurance agencies can become privy to that 
information.79 For example, 23andMe outlines in their terms and conditions that 
“[g]enetic [i]nformation that you choose to share with your physician or other health 
care providers may become part of your medical record and through that route be 
accessible to other health care providers and/or insurance companies in the future.”80 
The terms provide that if an individual receives information about adverse health 
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conditions and does not disclose the information to their insurance provider when 
asked to do so, they may be committing a fraud.81 For the average consumer with 
scarce knowledge of insurance contracts and disclosure requirements for avoiding 
fraud, these terms are likely terrifying . . . if consumers read them.  
As with terms regarding employer-sponsored wellness programs (and most other 
contracts), consumers likely do not read the terms and conditions associated with 
their DTC genetic testing kit.82 What is more, unlike employer-sponsored wellness 
programs, where an employer or human resources specialist could spell out the terms 
of the wellness program contract to the employee, no one is helping the consumer 
interpret or understand the gravity of participating in a DTC genetic testing service.83 
After all, that is a key feature of DTC genetic testing: no doctors, no geneticists, no 
testing specialists. For many people, this is a perk—but it is a perk with consequences 
they hardly understand.84 It may be annoying and costlier to go to a doctor or a lab 
to undergo genetic tests to see if you are predisposed to disease. But at least if you 
go to the doctor, you are subject to informed consent and covered by a doctor-patient 
relationship.85 What is more, you get an expert, in-person opinion on what your 
genetic information means and how your genetics could adversely impact your 
health.86 DTC genetic testing services provide none of these safeguards.87 By using 
these services, you embark on your genetic journey alone. 
Scholars, including Kishore, agree almost unanimously that consumers using 
DTC genetic testing services should receive some variation of informed consent—
whether it is actually called informed consent or not.88 While informed consent 
traditionally is only required where there is a physician-patient relationship, the 
nature of DTC genetic testing is largely medical, especially when consumers test for 
predisposition to disease.89 Indeed, if the sort of testing that DTC genetic testing 
companies provide were performed by a doctor, informed consent would be 
required.90 Logically, then, it makes sense to require DTC genetic companies to 
provide some variation of informed consent to ensure consumers receive some form 
of risk disclosure. 
Courts have applied two informed consent standards to determine what qualifies 
as adequate disclosure to a patient: the reasonable physician standard and the 
reasonable patient standard.91 The reasonable physician standard places a premium 
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on patient welfare but sacrifices patient autonomy by allowing physicians to choose 
what is best for the patient.92 Under this standard, physicians only have to disclose 
what the reasonable physician in their situation would disclose to a patient, not what 
the reasonable patient would want to hear. The reasonable physician standard also 
permits doctors to invoke the “therapeutic privilege” if they believe disclosing 
information to their patient will harm their welfare.93 
The reasonable patient standard, which courts impose only in a minority of 
jurisdictions, emphasizes patient autonomy more than the reasonable physician 
standard.94 This standard seems to be ideal in consumer settings in general and the 
DTC genetic testing setting in particular because patients will receive information 
about their predisposition to disease regardless of the harm and trauma that may 
result.95 DTC genetic testing companies cannot evade the potential trauma 
consumers may feel from their results. They cannot invoke the therapeutic privilege, 
because if they did, their services would be futile. What is more, allowing DTC 
genetic testing companies to use the reasonable physician standard could pose a 
financial conflict of interest, as companies may refrain from disclosing information 
about genetic testing out of fears that results or consequences from the tests may 
discourage consumer participation.96 According to Kishore, the reasonable patient 
standard is the most pragmatic informed consent standard available in the DTC 
genetic testing arena.97 
As DTC genetic testing companies delve further into GHR reporting and continue 
to develop diagnostic services that incur upon doctor’s medical opinions, consumers 
should be aware of what they are signing up for.98 This is especially true as PEWPA 
looms in Congress. As this paper will discuss in Part III, DTC genetic test results that 
spur a visit to the doctor could drastically affect a patient’s wellness program 
requirements and insurance liabilities. What was a seemingly innocuous attempt to 
trace patient genetic predisposition to disease could lead patients down an invasive 
and expensive battle with employers and insurers steadfast on curbing medical costs. 
II. JUDICIAL GLOSS . . . OR LACK THEREOF: THE PRESERVING EMPLOYEE WELLNESS 
PROGRAMS ACT IN LIGHT OF EEOC LITIGATION 
On its face, PEWPA smacks of illegality—primarily because it flies in the face of 
GINA. GINA specifically bars insurers and employers from discriminating against 
employees based on genetic information or from requiring them to provide genetic 
information involuntarily. PEWPA encourages the latter and makes it easier to 
accomplish the former. A hallmark of GINA is that it only permits employers and 
insurers to see employee healthcare information in aggregate form. PEWPA would 
drastically weaken GINA, allowing employers, for the first time, to see genetic 
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information of specific individuals. Nevertheless, judicial hesitance to address the 
issue casts doubt on whether a court would strike down PEWPA. 
In 2017, AARP provided the court an opportunity to strike down an EEOC rule 
permitting employers to require spouses of employees to submit to genetic testing to 
qualify for a wellness program and its concomitant insurance premium deduction.99 
The District Court for the District of Columbia handed down a major win to 
employee advocates but punted on the genetic testing issue—holding only that the 
thirty percent insurance premium hike on employees who choose not to participate 
in an employer-sponsored wellness program was involuntary and thus violated 
GINA.100  
The court’s reluctance to address the genetic testing requirement in the EEOC’s 
rules, even in dicta, suggests that the court either does not know how it would rule 
on the issue or that it does not a see a blatant problem with the requirement.101 While 
AARP did not ask the court to strike down the genetic testing provision, the court’s 
decision to strike down the insurance premium rate as an involuntary penalty was 
groundbreaking.102 Thus, it is somewhat surprising that a progressive bench did not 
even mention the genetic testing requirement. The court’s silence speaks even louder 
considering PEWPA passed the committees on Commerce, Energy, and Ways and 
Means unchanged and on partisan grounds just five days before the court issued its 
opinion.103 While proper judicial etiquette would counsel against discussing 
PEWPA, courts often seize on opportunities to address controversial issues. What is 
more, although PEWPA was not ripe for review, the EEOC rules permitting 
employers to require employee spouses to submit to genetic testing were. Thus, the 
court could have addressed the genetic testing issue in the EEOC rules in its 2017 
opinion, but it did not.104 
The EEOC Rules and PEWPA appear different in one key aspect: to whom they 
apply.105 Specifically, the EEOC rules only permit employers to require the spouse 
of an employee to submit to genetic testing. The EEOC rules do not allow employers 
to require an employee or an employee’s children to submit to genetic testing, 
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whereas PEWPA would.106 The EEOC justified its rule on the basis that employee 
spouses do not share similar genes with an employee, unlike children, who would 
share similar genes to the employee.107 Thus, the EEOC contends that requiring 
employee spouses to submit to genetic testing does not foster an environment for 
employers to discriminate against an employee based on their genes.108 This logic is 
shaky on two grounds.  
First, under group health plans that cover employee spouses, employers have just 
as much of an incentive to discriminate against spouses based on genetic information 
and health abnormalities as they do with employees. In cost and coverage terms, 
employees and employee spouses are the same since employers cover them both. So, 
while employees may not face discrimination from their employer at the office, there 
is nothing stopping them from facing discrimination via an insurance premium hike 
if their spouse does not participate in the genetic testing. Such an effect on an 
employee’s pocketbook could easily spill over into a workplace dispute—
consequently leading to the discrimination that the EEOC said was unlikely to 
happen. 109 The EEOC is using employee spouses as test subjects and as a means to 
eventually test employees—only testing employees will come with a congressional 
blessing. 
Second, GINA adopts ERISA’s definition of “employee,” which includes an 
employee of an employer and the employee’s spouse and children.110 The EEOC 
claims that, because spouses do not have a similar genetic makeup and predisposition 
to disease as their spouses, employees and their spouses face minimal risks of 
discrimination.111 Whether this rationale is true is debatable at best. But even if it is 
true, it almost certainly violates GINA—especially when analyzing the text of the 
statute.112 While the letter and spirit of legislative policy goals are important, the text 
of GINA clearly bars the EEOC rules as written. And because PEWPA takes the 
EEOC rules one step further and permits employers to require employees and their 
children to submit to genetic testing, PEWPA should be struck down as well if 
passed. Thus, while the EEOC rules and PEWPA appear distinct, they are actually 
very similar. Judicial analysis of either the EEOC rules or PEWPA should yield the 
same result: eradication of the genetic testing requirement. 
The EEOC has remained in the dark about their next moves—most likely waiting 
to see how Congress responds to PEWPA. If PEWPA passes, the EEOC’s job—at 
least as it pertains to their court order to promulgate new rules—would likely be 
finished because PEWPA would encompass its work. For PEWPA to pass judicial 
muster and not violate GINA, the EEOC, or whichever scheme and entity Congress 
charges to regulate employee genetic testing, will have to ensure that any genetic 
information employees provide to employers for wellness programs will be provided 
voluntarily. But what the court considers “voluntary” is largely elusive. Are twenty-
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rive percent penalties for nonparticipation voluntary? Must the penalty dip under 
twenty percent? Fifteen percent? Or, more realistically, should the degree of 
voluntariness reflect an individual’s financial capacity? Some employees can 
stomach a thirty percent penalty. Others could not take on a five percent hit. 
Perspective matters, and whatever choice Congress and administrative regulators 
make, they must keep that in mind. 
III. MOVING FORWARD: PEWPA’S FATE & RESPONDING TO ITS AFTERMATH—
REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME 
In its 2017 opinion striking down the EEOC’s wellness programs insurance 
premium hike as involuntary, the court ordered the EEOC to promulgate new rules 
by August 2018 to make the incentives voluntary.113 In a May 2018 status update, 
the EEOC stated that it does not plan on updating its rules in time for the August 
2019 deadline.114 Insurance and employment experts suggest the EEOC’s defiance 
rests in large part on a belief that President Trump will appoint a new EEOC 
commissioner.115 With Republicans gaining additional seats in the Senate, this hunch 
becomes ever more likely. If the Trump administration turns its eye towards PEWPA 
and employer access to employee genetic information, one could only guess at what 
the administration would seek to accomplish.116 The fact that Democrats spurred the 
wellness program rush via the ACA will likely only fuel Republicans to push 
insurance premium deductions conditioned on wellness program participation to 
their outermost bounds. 
With the current political climate and slate of Supreme Court justices in mind, 
employee advocates and policymakers need to develop a plan to address PEWPA if 
it passes and if it fails. If PEWPA passes, employee advocates need to develop a 
mechanism to make the current wellness programs more effective—to the point 
where employers have faith that they do not need to require employees to submit to 
genetic testing to qualify. And if PEWPA fails, either in Congress or if the judiciary 
strikes it down, employee advocates need to develop a plan to counteract PEWPA 
2.0. Otherwise the win will be short-lived. This paper will offer my opinions 
regarding both scenarios below. 
A. Living in a World with PEWPA and Mitigating its Aftermath 
The worst-case scenario for employees is if Congress approves PEWPA in its 
current state. As written, PEWPA would permit employers to condition employer-
sponsored wellness programs—and the insurance premium deductions associated 
with them—on whether employees submit to genetic testing. While most bills do not 
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make it through Congress unaltered, most bills do not make it through Ways and 
Means either.117 Given that Democrats just regained control of the House of 
Representatives, it is unlikely they would vote to approve PEWPA as currently 
written. Nevertheless, it is not hard to envision a world with PEWPA, especially if 
Republicans can convince Democrats tied to the ACA and big business to bend in 
their favor. If Congress approves PEWPA, employee advocates need to ensure that 
insurance premium deductions stemming from PEWPA do not coerce employees to 
make involuntary decisions. 
Whether Congress approves PEWPA or not, one thing is certain: big business 
wants to require employees to submit to genetic testing to qualify for wellness 
programs and their concomitant insurance premium deductions.118 The American 
Benefits Counsel, which advocates on behalf of Fortune 500 companies like AT&T, 
ExxonMobile, CBS, and MetLife, has penned multiple memos urging Congress to 
bolster its efforts to improve employer-sponsored wellness programs via genetic 
testing requirements.119 With this type of money and pressure backing PEWPA, it is 
imperative that employee advocates pressure the EEOC to promulgate regulations 
with penalties significantly below the thirty percent mark that the court struck down 
in 2017. Presenting the issue to employers in the context of informed consent could 
help.  
Framing employer-sponsored wellness programs in the context of informed 
consent would humanize them—especially if employers require employees to submit 
to genetic testing. After all, few things define human health as much as our genetic 
makeup.120 While a court has found a thirty percent penalty for not participating in a 
wellness program to be involuntary, coercive, and in violation of GINA, employee 
advocates need to push this logic further and persuade the judiciary to apply it as a 
modified informed consent standard for employees.121 That is, the court and 
Congress need to require employers to disclose the nature of wellness programs to 
their employees to ensure that employees understand (or, at least, understand better) 
the potential physiological and financial impact that the testing could bring about. To 
date, PEWPA is the most ideal vehicle to accomplish this task. 
Courts have been hesitant to apply informed consent outside of the physician-
patient relationship, particularly because the physician-patient relationship differs 
from almost all other fiduciary relationships. However, requiring employees to 
submit to genetic testing could qualify as a medical procedure, and thus fall within 
the bounds of informed consent, because it treads on diagnosing patients. This paper 
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argues that Congress (but more realistically, courts) should require employers to 
provide employees an informed consent-like disclosure regarding how their genetic 
information will be used in their employer-sponsored wellness program because 
these requirements require employees to undergo medical procedures.122 Just as DTC 
genetic testing providers should be required to employ the reasonable-patient 
standard under Kishore’s analysis, Congress should require employers and DTC 
genetic testing companies to provide employees with information that the reasonable 
employee would find relevant to a wellness program because employees are 
submitting to tests that, if conducted, could harm them financially and jeopardize 
their ability to get future insurance.123 Because wellness programs are designed to 
prevent disease and ailments, employees do not find themselves in a position that 
would warrant the therapeutic exception.124 Thus, the reasonable-patient standard is 
the ideal standard for genetic testing in the wellness programs context because this 
standard will provide employees with a framework to view their predisposition to 
disease and to help prevent developing illnesses.125 The reasonable physician 
standard is ill-equipped to deal with this issue, just like it would inadequately protect 
consumers in the DTC genetic testing context, because employers would find 
themselves with an inherent conflict of interest.126 While employees are not 
consumers in the same sense that DTC genetic test users are, ideally, they will make 
their decision whether to participate in the program voluntarily, like consumers.  
To skirt informed consent, wellness program providers will likely require 
employees to submit to a form of DTC genetic testing and provide those results to 
the wellness programs provider to develop their personalized program. If wellness 
program providers pursued employee genetic information via this route, they would 
be doing exactly what DTC genetic testing companies warn against: providing 
genetic information to medical professionals who, in turn, would use your genetic 
information in a way that may alter your insurance costs. If Congress approves 
PEWPA, employee advocates could press for regulations requiring doctors or 
certified lab technicians to conduct the genetic tests. This way, employees will 
receive at least some form of informed consent regarding their genetic information 
and will enter a physician-patient relationship with binding ethical duties. However, 
by providing genetic information to a medical professional, a patient will be more 
likely to be diagnosed with an ailment127—and thus face steeper insurance costs—
than if she used a DTC genetic testing service. Neither option is perfect, so analyzing 
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If Congress approves PEWPA, it should direct the EEOC to establish baseline 
disclosure subjects that employers must provide to employees. Employers should 
have to disclose how employee genetic information may cause their insurance rates 
to increase if their genetic tests result in them being diagnosed with an ailment. 
Further, should employees choose not to provide their genetic information, 
employers should comprehensively explain how their insurance costs will increase. 
Employers must emphasize that employees will not face discrimination in the 
workplace based on their genetic predisposition to disease or on their decision 
whether to participate in a wellness program. Most importantly, employers should 
underscore to employees that employee health trumps cost savings. PEWPA will 
likely polarize employers and employees if enacted. Cutting costs on employee 
health insurance plans only works if an employer has employees.  
The American Benefits Council and employers will likely protest congressional 
mandates to provide informed consent-like disclosure to employees because 
employers do not have a physician-patient relationship with employees.128 Moreover, 
they will likely argue that employees will have already received informed consent 
from the doctor or lab technician who conducts their genetic test or from the terms 
and conditions of the DTC genetic testing kit they use. Employers could also adopt 
Persad’s argument that informed consent is not necessary in the wellness program 
context because to qualify for employment, all employees must make healthcare 
decisions that cut against their autonomy.129 However, Persad missed the mark when 
he compared requiring an employee to ingest medication to qualify for a wellness 
program to requiring a taxi driver to pass an eye exam to qualify for a job.  
Persad conflates a requirement to protect the welfare of others (passing an eye 
exam so you can see the road and not hit citizens and/or crash your car and harm 
your customers) with a mandate to take medication that, if not ingested, likely would 
not affect third parties.130 Individuals have a right to informed consent, but that right 
cannot infringe on the rights of others, especially if that infringement can result in 
public harm.131 Requiring a patient to choose between taking a medication (a form 
of medical procedure) or risk losing a $1,500 insurance premium deduction does not 
implicate third parties, and neither do genetic tests (which, if performed by a doctor, 
are medical procedures) to determine an employee’s predisposition to disease. Persad 
correctly identifies that the law will always require employees to meet certain 
medical benchmarks to qualify for a job.132 But the law must place these 
requirements on a spectrum and not as binary choices. Expect employers to advance 
this argument in the beginning to gauge how much they must give to attain their 
interests. 
With the 2017 AARP decision in mind, employers should be conscious to not 
impose coercive insurance premium penalties (or provide insurance premium 
incentives—they are the distinctions without differences) on employees who do not 
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participate. Although the District Court for the District of Columbia did not strike 
down the EEOC’s rules pertaining to genetic testing requirements, it indicated its 
displeasure with the EEOC’s push to allow employers to penalize employees who do 
not participate in wellness programs.133 It would be wise for the EEOC to alter its 
penalty/incentive thresholds well below thirty percent. Further, to withhold judicial 
scrutiny, the EEOC should require employers to disclose how genetic testing will 
impact employee insurance costs. If Congress passes PEWPA (or a variation of it), 
transparency will be key to fostering trust between employers and employees and 
truly bolstering employee well-being. 
B. What Doesn’t Kill Congress (and Big Business) Makes it Stronger: Fighting 
PEWPA 2.0 
If PEWPA fails in Congress, or if a court strikes it down, it would be naïve to 
think that this will be the last we hear from wellness programs centered on genetic 
testing requirements. The American Benefits Council vehemently supports this bill, 
and its members will likely continue funding legislation designed to decrease 
employer-borne healthcare costs.134 And they should. But employee advocates must 
make every effort to convince employers that compelled genetic testing is not the 
answer. 
It is easy to see why employers—and more importantly, insurers—would want to 
require employees to submit to genetic testing to qualify for insurance premium 
deductions. Precision medicine has worked remarkably well—almost entirely 
because patients provide their genetic information for doctors to develop a treatment 
plan based on their genetic makeup.135 On the other hand, wellness programs have 
failed to save employers and insurers money and have failed to create a healthier 
workforce.136 One possible explanation for their failure could be based on the lack 
of employee genetic information provided to tailor employee-specific workout 
programs, diet plans, and medical treatment regimens. If employees provided their 
genetic information to help create a program personalized to their genetic needs, 
there is a good chance it would work. But for many generations currently using 
employer-sponsored wellness programs, especially older ones, it is probably too late. 
While employer-sponsored wellness programs have been prevalent since 2010, 
the ACA incentivized medical professionals to implement them to help prevent 
early-onset diseases.137 The goal of wellness programs is to prevent chronic ailments, 
such as heart disease and obesity, from developing in the first place. But many of the 
employees currently suffering from illnesses that wellness programs were designed 
to prevent began developing the illnesses long before they participated in their first 
wellness program.138 It is hard to determine how accurate a disease prevention 
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mechanism is on a group of people who developed unhealthy habits and ailments 
early on in their lives. For participants with heart disease or clogged arteries, a 
wellness program will not cure them—and it is not supposed to. Rather, wellness 
programs work to prevent these issues from ever starting.139 The public should 
scrutinize any government-sponsored initiative meticulously, especially when 
consumers direct billions of dollars into it. However, well-intentioned initiatives 
deserve a fair shot. Wellness programs have not received a fair shot yet. Employers 
should remain keen on providing insurance premium deductions conditioned on 
participation in a wellness program, but they should also familiarize themselves with 
how they are supposed to work. 
To help see better results without coercing employees to submit to genetic testing, 
employers should implement stronger quality-assurance measures to ensure 
employees are actually making good on their promise to participate in a wellness 
program. Many employees see wellness programs as an annoying cost-saver, rather 
than an opportunity to improve their health.140 Employees with this mindset thus 
often do not carry out the goals their wellness program provider designed for them.141 
For example, some male employees have admitted that they lied about receiving a 
mammogram solely to receive enough points to qualify for insurance premium 
deductions conditioned on their participation in wellness programs.142 Another 
employee stated that the nicotine tests in her program are easy to cheat. She said 
“Two people on my team smoke cigars and chew tobacco . . . . They know how long 
it takes for nicotine to clear from their system to test negative, so they stop long 
enough just for the test, then fire right back up again.”143 While not all employees try 
to game the system, the fact that it is easy to certainly does not give employers a 
strong impression of the programs they help pay for.144 Employee advocates need to 
find a way to resolve these problems. Otherwise, why would employers not resort to 
genetic testing, especially since it has worked wonders in the medical world? 
CONCLUSION 
PEWPA presents Congress with an opportunity to make a lasting difference in the 
healthcare and employment law sectors. Whether Congress approves PEWPA or not, 
one thing is for certain: employers will continue working to make wellness programs, 
and the concomitant insurance premium deductions attached to them, worth their 
money. And they should. It is up to employee advocates, legal scholars, and medical 
professionals to find a way to improve wellness programs without requiring 
employees to submit to involuntary genetic testing to qualify for a wellness program. 
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PEWPA off track is imperative to preserving the integrity of GINA and placing 
employee rights above the bottom line. 
 
